A radical agenda for the UKA work in progress to explore and develop socio-political options for the United Kingdom.United KingdomOrganization_9519adda-8b96-4228-82b8-7761c1cb12b9United Kingdom The United Kingdom is made up of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.Vision_2da868ca-5ae1-4e69-84d0-b29b4920f01eMission_2da868ca-5ae1-4e69-84d0-b29b4920f01eSimplicitySimplicity makes things easier to understand, thereby increasing transparency, and reducing costFairness for allReform the Benefits SystemReform the Benefits SystemGoal_71095f06-a87e-4640-90d3-274ae4424e231Ensure that only those that truly need state support receive all the support that they need.Scrap the state pensionScrap the state pensionObjective_4a2f403c-a131-48b7-8827-996dccd460271People don’t need to stop work just because they’ve attained some arbitrary age.
People don’t need a state pension if they already have enough money.
The money saved could be redirected to those who need it because they are unable to work, and don’t have other sources of income or wealth, regardless of wealth.Reform the tax systemReform the tax systemGoal_7dbf252c-a883-4587-b464-ec35248cebe92Scrap unearned incomeScrap unearned incomeObjective_e562a125-0dad-4f18-bd1d-9fbb826c7d231Scrap corporation taxScrap corporation taxObjective_4a23fdd8-b75d-46b7-928e-1c8995d208ae2Scrap National InsuranceScrap National InsuranceObjective_fad28763-0e5f-4262-8a4f-06d50b9f4ee13State pensions liabilities are not included in the official national debtAccounting conventions can allow the Government to present the public finances in a way that understates the full scale of long-term commitments. In particular, liabilities associated with state pensions are not included in the official measure of national debt, even though they represent a substantial and effectively unavoidable obligation that future taxpayers will have to honour.
The latest published official accrued-to-date estimate identified here is £4.8 trillion at 31 December 2018—about 224% of 2018 GDP. This is the present value of State Pension entitlements already built up under the rules then in force; it is not an estimate of every future State Pension payment that might arise. The State Pension is treated as an unfunded social-security benefit, with expenditure recognised when entitlement falls due, rather than as a liability included in official national debt or the Whole of Government Accounts balance sheet.
This figure should not be confused with public-sector employee pension liabilities. The Whole of Government Accounts reported a separate net liability of £1.396 trillion at 31 March 2025 for public-sector employee pensions.
A concrete illustration of the accounting issue is provided by the privatisation of Royal Mail. Under the accounting treatment used, assets from the Royal Mail pension scheme were recorded as income on the Government balance sheet. That meant these assets could be used to reduce (“pay down”) the officially reported national debt. At the same time, the additional pension liabilities taken on were treated as “off-balance-sheet”, meaning they were not added to the official national debt figure.
The practical effect is that the headline national debt can fall (or appear lower than it otherwise would) because certain pension assets are counted in a way that benefits the balance sheet, while corresponding long-term pension obligations are excluded from the debt measure. Although these obligations do not show up in official national debt, they are major financial commitments that future generations will have to fund.
Sources: ONS, Pensions in the national accounts: a fuller picture of the UK’s funded and unfunded pension obligations; HM Treasury, Whole of Government Accounts 2024–25.Brexit leaves the UK isolated and a rule takerThe United Kingdom will left the European Union on Friday March 29 at 11pm 2018. This is set out in primary legislation, the EU Withdrawal Act, with the qualification that it can only be changed if a Minister of the Crown proposes a regulation to do so. (Source: Sorry Brexiteers, but Parliament doesn’t want No Deal, and MPs will kill it off published 03/12/2018)
As a small country and without the collective bargaining power of Europe, the UK could find itself forced to accept whatever rules Europe, the US or other global powerhouses force on it in return for trade and other concessions.
The United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union is framed as a legally fixed event, set out in primary legislation (the EU Withdrawal Act). In the wording cited, the law states that the UK will leave the EU on Friday 29 March at 11pm, with the qualification that this can only be changed if a Minister of the Crown proposes a regulation to do so. This is used to underline that the departure is not merely political intent but is embedded in statute, and that changing course requires a specific formal mechanism.
The central strategic risk is that, outside the EU, the UK may become more isolated and shift from being a rule shaper to being a rule taker. The reasoning is that the UK on its own is a smaller negotiating actor than large blocs and major powers. Without the EU’s collective bargaining power, the UK could find itself needing to accept rules set by others—such as the EU, the United States, or other global powerhouses—as the price of securing trade deals or wider concessions. In practice, this implies reduced leverage in negotiations and an increased likelihood that the UK must align with standards, regulations, and policy positions determined elsewhere, rather than influencing them through membership of a larger negotiating bloc.The press lacks accountability and credibilitySee this video from John Cleese: https://twitter.com/JohnCleese/status/1019870590579208192
The concern is that parts of the UK press operate with insufficient accountability and, as a result, suffer from reduced credibility in the eyes of the public. This can show up as a perceived gap between the influence the press has on public opinion and political debate, and the strength (or enforcement) of the standards, oversight, and consequences that apply when reporting is misleading, distorted, or unfair.
A concrete prompt for this concern is captured in a public commentary video by John Cleese, which is used here as an illustration of the wider argument that the press can shape narratives while not consistently meeting expectations of trustworthiness, accuracy, and responsibility. The implication is not simply that individual stories may be questionable, but that there may be a broader, systemic credibility problem that weakens trust in journalism as an institution.
If the press is widely seen as unaccountable, several downstream effects can follow:
- Public trust in news declines, making it harder for citizens to distinguish reliable reporting from partial, sensationalised, or misleading content.
- Political and social debate can become more polarised, as contested or low-trust information sources are used to reinforce pre-existing views rather than inform shared understanding.
- Legitimate scrutiny and investigative journalism can be undermined by association, because audiences may become sceptical of even well-evidenced reporting.
- People may disengage from news altogether or shift to alternative sources (including low-quality online outlets), further weakening the role of credible, broadly trusted journalism in a democracy.
Overall, the issue is framed as a reputational and governance weakness within the press ecosystem: the press is influential, but is perceived to lack sufficiently effective mechanisms that ensure it is consistently answerable for what it publishes and, therefore, consistently worthy of public trust.UK electricity prices are comparatively high, undermining industrial competitiveness and exposing households and businesses to volatile energy costs## UK energy prices: a comparative electricity-cost problem with structural causes
The United Kingdom has a material international competitiveness problem in electricity prices, especially for businesses and electricity-intensive industries. The evidence does not support an equally broad claim about gas: UK gas prices have been relatively lower than those in comparable European countries.
### Latest international comparison
The latest published official EU comparison covers July–December 2025. It showed that:
- UK household electricity prices for a medium consumer were 29.78p/kWh, including taxes, levies and applicable subsidies: the fourth highest in the EU14-plus-UK comparison, and 6.16p/kWh above the group median.
- UK household gas prices were 7.05p/kWh: the lowest in that comparison group, and 3.76p/kWh below the median.
- UK medium non-domestic electricity prices were the highest in the EU14-plus-UK group.
- UK medium non-domestic gas prices were below the group median.
The September 2026 release confirms that updated EU electricity and gas comparisons will next be published in December 2026. (gov.uk)
### Latest UK price position
For April–June 2026, the average UK non-domestic price, including the Climate Change Levy, was:
- Electricity: 24.51p/kWh
- Gas: 5.28p/kWh
For manufacturing, excluding the Climate Change Levy, the average was:
- Electricity: 17.4p/kWh
- Gas: 3.85p/kWh
These figures reinforce the importance of electricity costs to industrial competitiveness. (assets.publishing.service.gov.uk)
## Structural causes of high UK electricity prices
The comparative data identifies the outcome, rather than proving a single cause. However, several structural features of the UK energy system are likely to contribute to high electricity costs and to the exposure of households and businesses to price volatility.
### 1. Gas can set the wholesale electricity price
The wholesale electricity market uses marginal pricing: the final generation source needed to meet demand can set the price received by all generators in that trading period. When gas-fired power stations are marginal, gas and carbon costs can therefore influence the wholesale price even when a substantial share of electricity is generated by lower-cost renewables or nuclear power.
This creates a gap between the relatively low operating cost of some generation technologies and the price paid for electricity. It also means that the UK remains exposed to gas-price shocks while gas-fired generation is required for system balancing and security of supply.
### 2. Limited system flexibility and storage
Wind and solar generation are variable. A reliable low-carbon electricity system therefore needs sufficient storage, demand-side flexibility, interconnection, dispatchable low-carbon capacity and firm back-up generation.
Where these capabilities are inadequate or expensive, the system relies more heavily on gas-fired generation at periods of low renewable output or high demand. This can raise balancing and capacity costs, increase exposure to gas prices, and reinforce the price-setting role of gas.
### 3. Network constraints and inefficient transmission arrangements
The UK needs major investment in transmission and distribution networks to connect new generation, electrify heating and transport, and accommodate changing patterns of electricity demand. These costs are ultimately recovered from consumers through network charges.
Constraints in the transmission network can also lead to curtailment of renewable generation in one area while more expensive generation is required elsewhere. A single national wholesale price provides limited local signals about these differences in supply, demand and network capacity.
### 4. The allocation of policy, network and balancing costs
Electricity bills include more than the cost of generation. They also include network charges, supplier costs, balancing costs, system-operation costs, taxes and policy costs. How these are allocated between electricity and gas, and between households, businesses and taxpayers, can affect both affordability and industrial competitiveness.
Even where decarbonisation investment reduces long-term system costs, recovering a significant share of those costs through electricity bills can make electrification less attractive and worsen the relative burden on electricity-intensive firms.
### 5. Exposure to international gas markets
The UK is connected to international gas markets and has limited long-duration gas storage relative to its exposure to winter demand. This leaves consumers vulnerable to global supply disruptions, geopolitical events and sharp changes in gas prices.
Although the UK’s comparative gas retail price has been relatively low in the latest EU comparison, gas remains strategically important because it can influence electricity prices and provides back-up capacity to the power system.
## Strategic implication
The principal policy challenge is not simply to lower gas prices or to choose between renewables and security of supply. It is to reform the electricity system so that the benefits of lower-cost domestic generation, including renewables, are translated into lower and more stable costs for households and productive businesses.
Policy options should therefore be assessed against five tests:
- whether they reduce the underlying cost of the electricity system;
- whether they reduce exposure to volatile gas prices;
- whether they improve network efficiency and locational investment signals;
- whether they allocate unavoidable costs fairly between households, businesses and taxpayers; and
- whether they protect reliability, resilience and decarbonisation.
The core insight is therefore: UK electricity is comparatively expensive, particularly for business, because the design and constraints of the electricity system can prevent low-cost generation from consistently translating into low consumer prices. UK gas prices should be analysed separately rather than treated as part of the same comparative cost problem.
Sources: Quarterly Energy Prices: June 2026 - GOV.UK, Quarterly Energy Prices September 2026UK government spending has outpaced economic growth, increasing fiscal pressure and constraining resources for private consumption, investment, saving and enterpriseUK government expenditure has increased faster than the economy over the long term, increasing the share of national output absorbed by the state. Total general government expenditure rose from around 38% of GDP in 1995 to around 46% in 2024, having reached 52% of GDP in 2020 during the coronavirus pandemic. (ons.gov.uk)
The most recent Office for Budget Responsibility forecast estimated total public spending at 44.0% of GDP in 2024–25, rising to 44.9% in 2027–28 before declining gradually to 44.3% by 2030–31. This would remain 5.2 percentage points above the pre-pandemic level in 2019–20. (obr.uk)
This supports the concern that government expenditure has become too large relative to the productive economy. A persistently larger public sector requires a correspondingly large and sustainable tax base, and limits the proportion of national resources available for private consumption, saving, investment and enterprise.
The central strategic question is therefore not simply whether individual areas of public spending are worthwhile, but whether the overall scale, affordability and composition of expenditure are consistent with a sustainable, growing economy. Any reform should distinguish clearly between:
- expenditure that provides essential public services or productive long-term investment;
- expenditure that protects people who genuinely need support; and
- expenditure that may be unnecessarily complex, poorly targeted, ineffective or unaffordable at its present scale.
Sources: Government expenditure in the UK - Office for National Statistics, EFOs - Office for Budget ResponsibilityStrategyPlan_2da868ca-5ae1-4e69-84d0-b29b4920f01e2026-10-18https://www.stratnavapp.com/StratML/Part3/2da868ca-5ae1-4e69-84d0-b29b4920f01eSubmitter_2da868ca-5ae1-4e69-84d0-b29b4920f01e